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The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has established
aviation accident and incident investigation obligations within Article 26 of its
Convention on International Civil Aviation. This is further developed in ICAO
Annex 13 - Aircraft Incident and Incident Investigation and Annex 19 – Safety
Management. The ICAO member States have implemented these international
aviation investigation standards in various regulations, policies and procedures
that have traditionally focused on the most severe events. Further implementation
of aviation safety investigations into less severe events has significant
opportunities to enhance aviation safety and operational efficiency.
Definitions
•
•

•

•

Incident. An event, other than an accident, associated with the operation
of an aircraft which affects or could affect the safety of operation.
Investigation. A process conducted for the purpose of accident or incident
prevention which includes the gathering and analysis of information, the
drawing of conclusions, the determination of causes and/or contributing
factors and, when appropriate, the making of safety recommendations.
Occurrence. An adverse event or condition, other than an accident or
incident, associated with an aircraft which affects or could affect
operational safety.
Safety Recommendation. A proposal of a safety investigation based on
information derived from an investigation, made with the intention of
preventing accidents and incidents and which in no case creates a
presumption of blame or liability for an accident or incident. In addition to
safety recommendations arising from an investigation, safety
recommendations may result from diverse sources, including safety
studies. These recommendations may further be used to identify system
vulnerability, develop strategies for change, and prioritize the investment
of safety resources (ICAO, 2013b).
Service Provider Organizations

In general, revenue producing aviation organizations, service providers,
have an obligation to establish a safety program that includes a proactive element
to identify and resolve deficiencies. The State Safety Program (SSP) and Civil
Aviation Authority (CAA) should establish regulations for a Safety Management
System (SMS) in approved training organizations, commercial air transport,
maintenance organizations, air traffic services and aerodromes (ICAO, 2013b).
This should also extend to international general aviation operators of large or
turbojet aircraft. Included in this obligation is a foundation to monitor and
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respond to adverse events such as accidents and incidents utilizing traditional
safety investigation procedures. These safety investigations may be covered by
separate regulatory material from the transportation safety investigation authority.
It is important to note that many States provide separate safety and
enforcement investigations with separate utilization of the outcomes from such
programs. The policies and procedures of safety investigations should include
protections or prohibitions from the use of such material for enforcement actions
under ICAO Annex 19 Attachment B. The policies of the regulator can be used
for administrative or enforcement actions.
When incidents do not meet the reporting obligations under safety or
enforcement policies, the service provider should conduct an internal
investigation to identify safety deficiencies and implement safety mitigation in
order to ensure continued safety improvements and thus support safer and more
efficient operations. Guidance on the implementation of SMS and safety
investigations is also provided in FAA Advisory Circulars 120-92A for air
carriers. Such investigations may vary in complexity but the documentation of
these safety reviews is essential to build the foundation for future trend analysis
and to meet the organization’s quality assurance and SMS obligations. These
investigative techniques also reinforce the organization’s safety reporting culture
and provide training experience for the safety investigators.
The reinforcement of the safety culture also helps institutionalize the
limits of acceptable and unacceptable behavior (CASA, 2009a).
The
Counselling/discipline decision chart in Appendix B of the CASA SMS Toolkit
Booklet 2 provides a systematic matrix of how incidents and occurrences might
be resolved within the organization and assist in the identification of why such
adverse events happened and might be resolved. Workers and management thus
seek to identify unsafe or inefficient activities and resolve these deficiencies. The
safety risks are solicited through an active safety reporting system and
documented in a Safety Risk Registry. Management encourages such reporting
and understands that it is better to identify an unsafe condition than ignore it.
Everyone understands the necessity to comply with established safety obligations,
continually update those safety obligations and ensure that employees respect
such obligations. Those who decide not to comply with safety obligations and
commit a willful violation should expect to receive both disrespect from their
fellow workers and administrative actions from management.
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Aviation Organization Policy Statement
The organization should provide a safety policy that ensures the following:
•

•
•

Conduct objective and independent investigations of incidents by
documenting the facts, conditions, and circumstances of such occurrences
without implying blame or liability;
Identify safety deficiencies during investigations with the view toward
prevention of future occurrences;
As appropriate, disseminate the findings of the investigation and
implement actions to eliminate or reduce risks posed by identified safety
deficiencies.

Aviation service providers are part of an extraordinarily safe industry. As
such, the flying public and regulators have placed greater safety obligations upon
their operations. As discussed by Gessell and Dempsey (2011) non-aviation
activities generally operate under a condition known as Ordinary Care which has
been defined in the court cases Brown v Kendal and Osborne v Montgomery as
“that kind and degree of care, which prudent and cautious men would use, such as
is required by the exigency of the case, and such as is necessary to guard against
probable dander.” However, aviation service providers generally must provide
and Extraordinary Duty of Care that holds them to a highest duty to their
passengers, higher than that of reasonable care, by the court cases of O’Leary v
American Airlines and Krasnow v National Airlines.
General aviation also has greater than ordinary care requirements. These
are often enforced using such regulations as the Federal Aviation Regulation
FAR§91.13 - Careless or reckless operation: No person may operate an aircraft in
a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another.
Legislative Requirements
ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs)
ICAO member States are obliged to conduct aircraft accident and serious
incident investigation to comply with Article 26 of the Convention on
International Civil Aviation. This obligation is enacted by State laws and
regulations. Such legislation must establish an accident investigation authority
and the processes identified in ICAO Annex 13 - Aircraft Accident and Incident
Investigation. Furthermore, the newly published Annex 19 extends these SARPs
to include the obligation for aviation service providers such as aviation training
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organizations and airlines to implement investigations into less severe
deficiencies identified through their SMS and safety data collection applications.
Early aviation accident investigation evolved from maritime accident
investigation. Under the Rules of the Sea, the ship’s captain was ultimately
responsible for the safety of the ship. Similarly, aviation accident investigation
placed the responsibility of the aircraft in the captain’s hands unless some
extensive mechanical failure could be identified whereby the manufacturer shared
the responsibility. Through the advances in manufacturing and regulatory
oversight, this scheme of human error has remained the major causation of
aviation accidents and incidents. Many investigative advances have been
promoted with greater emphasis on non-reportable incidents and occurrences in
order to mitigate safety risk to an acceptable level and to share the obligation of
continual safety improvement throughout the aviation industry.
The development of the concept of accident causation has also aided in the
understanding of human and organizational errors and the methodology for
overcoming these deficiencies. Such deficiencies can range from active failures,
either through actions or inactions, to unidentified or latent conditions that are
often dormant until some triggering event is introduced, such as an autopilot
failure to maintain a safe flight envelope when icing is encountered (Reason,
1990). Under the concept of capturing the low hanging fruit, many incident or
occurrence investigations might settle for introducing additional training or
internal policies to overcome a systemic deficiency. However, if these were more
fully investigated using the methodology of an accident investigation, the
recommendations might be more beneficial by changing technology or operating
limitations of the aircraft. Again as example, an autopilot that might not be able
to function in icing conditions might have a procedure to disconnect the autopilot
and manually fly the aircraft, or limit the duration in which the aircraft could
operate in icing conditions. In reality, either the technology of the aircraft to
operate in icing conditions or the autopilot functions should be modified to
mitigate the risk of adverse flight performance in icing conditions. Thus the
obligation for the pilot to exercise exceptional flying skills would not be a
necessary recommendation. This also reduces the need for the organization to
develop special techniques to overcome deficiencies and thus accept such higher
risks - a process known as normalization of deviance. This might be successful for
a period of time when highly experienced pilots use their superior skills to
overcome such marginal operations; however, over time, new personnel will
attempt to emulate these normalized deviances with potentially adverse outcomes.
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Investigation Objective and Independence
ICAO Annex 13 establishes that accident and incident investigations must
be objective, independent of outside influence and must also be so accepted by the
service provider organization. ICAO Annex 13, Chapter 3, paragraph 3.1 – states
that the sole objective of an incident investigation shall be the prevention of
similar incidents. It is not the purpose of apportioning blame or liability. Chapter
5, paragraph 5.4 – further states that incident investigation authority shall have
independence in the conduct of the investigation and have unrestricted authority
over it; and, shall be separate from enforcement or administrative actions to
apportion blame or liability. Insulation from administrative action should also be
afforded to service provider internal safety investigations when such studies are
below the reporting obligations of the State (AAIB, 2013). The US National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Part 830 also ensures that their Accident
Investigation Reports can only be used for safety; however, factual information
such as air traffic radar recordings may also be shared with the regulator, the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), for both safety and enforcement actions.
The report and investigation obligations for air carriers, the FAA and NTSB are
further discussed in FAA Advisory Circular AC 120-30A.
Investigation Policy and Procedures
The service provider’s policy should include the obligation to support an
investigation by the regulator of all reportable accidents and incidents and to
internally investigate the circumstances of other incidents not meeting that
severity. If during an internal safety investigation or study of safety deficiencies
the service provider identifies conditions that may impact external organizations,
it should take immediate actions to disseminate such safety information.
For every accident or serious incident, there are perhaps hundreds of
minor occurrences that have the potential to become accidents. The evaluation of
hazard reports must ensure that the investigation is compliant with the safety
policy of the organization to achieve an acceptable level of safety. Such hazards
are captured in the Risk Registry for prioritization. An example of this process is
discussed in the CASA SMS Toolkit Booklet 3. Since resources to conduct such
investigations are often limited, there should be a proportional expenditure of
resources with the estimated level of safety risk. Regardless of the potential for
mitigation of a safety deficiency, a minimum of data should be collected in order
to establish a foundation for future trend analysis.
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The service provider’s investigators should have unhampered access to
incident information or aircraft components. The investigators should also solicit
support from equipment manufacturers, government agencies and experts as
needed. The development of positive relations during normal operations will
facilitate such support during adverse events. This will include permission to
photograph and document components and take statements to preclude loss of
vital information. Such data collection must also respect the privacy of individual
medical records or other protected or limited access material.
Statements from witnesses and those involved in an incident should be
insulated from enforcement through voluntary reporting systems such as the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Aviation Safety
Reporting Program which provides a waiver of enforcement by FAR §91.25
except where the information relates to an aircraft accident or intentional
violation. Similar insulation is provided in the Australian ATSB Act 2003 and
European Union Article 19 of the Investigation Regulation No 996/2010 Directive
94/56/EC. An international collaboration on SMS has been established by the
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the FAA Office of Aviation Safety
(AVS), ICAO, and Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA). In 2009 these
organizations established the Safety Management International Collaboration
Group (SM ICG) to support the implementation and harmonization of SMS.
Investigation Coordination
Aviation service providers should actively conduct studies or safety
surveys in order to provide adequate training, to identify deficiencies and to build
confidence in the safety review process. These reviews also build a foundation for
development of plans of action for more severe incident or accident. The SMS
committee and safety action group may also require supplemental support from
government and industry organizations. Thus consideration must be provided for
protection of individuals reporting deficiencies and limitations to incident
information source disclosure (ICAO, 2013a).
The organization’s safety investigators should be issued policy guidance
as to their authority and responsibility. The investigators should also be furnished
with guidance material that can be provided to witnesses and participants in the
investigation in order to protect the disclosure of the material gathered. Similarly,
the use of outside experts can be established through letters of understanding or
contracts which should caution them of their obligation to protect investigation
material from disclosure.
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Investigator Training
The service provider should have appropriate investigator training. Such
training should include an initial overview in investigation management and
witness interviewing, followed by on-the-job training under an experienced
investigator (ICAO, 2003). This can then be augmented by a formal incident
investigation course and more advanced training in specialties such as flight data
analysis and human factors (CASA, 2009b).
Investigator Equipment
In addition to individual training, investigators must be provided with
certain equipment and have policies and agreements in place for access to this
equipment such as flight data analysis and flight reconstruction applications. They
should also receive training and equipment for incident site work in support of
more severe incidents or accidents away from the service provider’s normal
location of operations. The ICAO Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident
Investigation, Part I (Doc 9756), has information related to an investigation field
kit and protective equipment for potential hazards at an incident site.
It is essential to consider all aspects of a prior incident before attempting to
re-enact an incident for study. Unfortunately many accidents or incidents have
been repeated during the investigation of prior events.
Incident Prevention Measures
ICAO Annex 13, Chapter 8, requires States to establish a mandatory
incident reporting system to collect actual or potential safety deficiency
information. States shall also establish voluntary incident reporting that is nonpunitive and has protection for the sources of the information under Chapter 5 of
Annex 19. Annex 19 further reinforces the obligation of incident investigation in
the State Safety Program Element 1.3 - Accident and incident investigation:
The State has established an independent accident and incident
investigation process, the sole objective of which is the prevention of
accidents and incidents, and not the apportioning of blame or liability.
Such investigations are in support of the management of safety in the
State. In the operation of the SSP, the State maintains the independence of
the accident and incident investigation organization from other State
aviation organizations.
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This is also implemented by the service provider in the SMS Components
related to Safety Risk Management, Safety Assurance and Safety Promotion.
State Safety Risk Management - Service provider’s safety requirements for SMS
“The State has established the controls which govern how service
providers will identify hazards and manage safety risks.”
State Safety Assurance - Safety data collection, analysis and exchange
“The State has established mechanisms to ensure the capture and storage
of data on hazards and safety risks at both an individual and aggregate
State level. The State has also established mechanisms to develop
information from the stored data, and to actively exchange safety
information with service providers and/or other States as appropriate.”
State Safety Promotion - External training, communication and dissemination of
safety information
The State provides education and promotes awareness of safety risks and
two-way communication of safety-relevant information to support, among
service providers, the development of an organizational culture that fosters
an effective and efficient SMS.
A sample case study of the implementation of a safety investigation or
review is provided in the appendix. The ICAO Safety Management Manual
Document 9859 provides additional emphasis into a service provider’s safety
practices through the Eight Building Blocks identified in Section 3.7.1 (ICAO,
2013a). These are further reinforced in Appendix 1 of ICAO Annex 19. A service
provider must be able to identify a deficiency before it can be managed. The
periodic measurement of safety indicators will allow the development of trends
and assist management in the allocation of resources. Safety performance
measurements can be used to document both safety performance and efficiency
performance through the need for fewer spare equipment or personnel due to
fewer damaged equipment or personnel injuries (UK, 2006, September). Such
continuous monitoring of normal operations for the identification of abnormalities
or exceedences is an important step. Dissemination of lessons learned and best
practices through the exchange of safety information enhances safety awareness,
builds an open or positive safety culture and further supports the identification of
safety issues. This is also referred to as a Just Safety Culture because
management and employees have a clear understanding of acceptable and
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unacceptable behaviour and how unacceptable behaviour might result in sanctions
under ICAO Annex 19, Appendix 2.
The Australian Civil Aviation Safety Agency (CASA) has provided
guidance for the development of its SMS and the investigation of safety
deficiencies by service providers in its CASA SMS Toolkit Booklet 4 Safety
Assurance. This includes incident and occurrence investigation, documentation
and dissemination.
CASA Regulation (CASR) Part 142.200 establishes the responsibilities of
a service provider’s safety manager and includes the obligation to
implement a SMS including corrective, remedial and preventative action;
regular discussion with the chief executive officer the effectiveness of the
SMS; and establish a continuous improvement system.
CSAR Part 142.265 establishes that the SMS must be a systemic approach
to managing safety by the identification of deficiencies related to training,
operations and human factors. This approach will include the
organizational structure, accountability, policies and procedures necessary
to manage safety in a systemic way during normal and emergency
operations. The SMS will monitor and measure safety performance and
conduct internal safety investigations in order to ensure the sustainability
of the organization through the management of change and provide for
continuous improvement.
Investigation Organization and Management
A safety review or investigation should be organized and managed so
that the investigators can efficiently perform their various tasks. It is essential
that an investigation proceeds systematically through all aspects of the incident
even when causes are apparent. This may include the use of specialized outside
experts.
A more complicated incident investigation management system may have
several functional areas with several investigation teams. Depending on the
magnitude and circumstances of the incident, there may be from two to ten
technical investigation areas that might include: Witnesses, Weather, Air Traffic
Services, Aircraft Structures, Aircraft Systems, Powerplants, Maintenance
Records, Survival Factors, Human Performance, Aircraft Performance, and Flight
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Recorders. Smaller incidents may be performed by a single investigator who may
be supplemented by specialists.
It is essential that all personnel with access to the information developed by
the safety investigation understand and comply with the process for distribution of
the finding in order to minimize speculation or inaccurate information. A central
point of approval of all reports and announcement must be established and all
inquiries sent to that person. Any premature dissemination of factual information,
speculation or rumors can prejudice the investigation and dilute the organization’s
confidence in the investigation outcomes.
Laboratory Testing of Aircraft Systems and Components
In some cases, examination or testing of specific components will be
required. The outside testing laboratory should follow the same policies and
procedures for tests and component examinations as used for the service
provider’s investigation. Often the component manufacturer’s facilities have
specialized equipment to assist in such analysis; however, close supervision by
the service provider’s investigators should be used to ensure there is no real or
perceived conflict of interest. Each component will be tagged with its name, part
number, serial number and the incident identifier. The component should be
protected for shipment and include the conditions under which the component
was operated and any suspected or specific faults to be tested so as to help focus
the efforts of the testing. At a minimum a telephone communication should be
made with the testing agency to establish a test plan and requested evaluations.
Simply sending a component for testing with a note that it failed is insufficient
guidance. After the testing is completed, the results will be reviewed and
incorporated into the investigation report.
Documentation of Incidents and Occurrences
All incident and occurrence reports should contain as much information as
necessary to capture all relative information for inclusion in trend analysis
programs for continuous improvement and monitoring. The report may include
both immediate and systemic findings. The identification of findings does not
imply fault or blame and shall not be used for administrative or civil action.
Where outside organizations are included in the findings, there should be
coordinated with such organizations prior to distribution of the report. The safety
team should also be mindful of the access of the report by regulators and other
parties, and where possible de-identify those involved. This may assist in the
promotion and solicitation of future critical safety information.
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The safety team, and those organizations involved in the investigation,
might identify safety deficiencies prior to the delivery of the final report. Where
appropriate, action to correct these identified deficiencies should be initiated as
soon as possible. It is also essential that a tracking system be implemented to
monitor the mitigation and ensure the corrective actions remain sufficient.
Findings and Recommendations for Mitigation of Deficiencies
The format of the safety investigation report will follow local guidance.
The circumstances of the incident or occurrence will determine the size and scope
of the report. Documents that are required to support the facts, analysis,
conclusions, and recommendations are often included in appendices to the report.
In consultation with the safety team members, the organization’s accountable
executive is responsible for evaluation of the evidence gathered and the drafting
of the report. While the investigation should strive to achieve concurrence with
all of the factual information, there may be alternative views in the report in order
to fully cover all contingencies. The accountable executive may also be assisted
by a separate safety expert in review of the safety investigation to ensure the
recommendations are sufficient to mitigate the risk of future incidents or
occurrences to an acceptable level.
The report may contain administrative actions, such as changes to standard
operating procedures. There may also be lessons learned to be included in
indoctrination and training evolutions to improve aviation safety culture of the
organization. A standardized method must be established to incorporate the safety
recommendations and corrective actions throughout the organization and to
ensure that those not present and new staff are made aware of these new
procedures. These processes are part of a change management program within the
organization (UK, 2013). Should the mitigation procedures prove inadequate, the
safety team should revisit the report and determine what additional steps must be
taken. Supporting outside organizations should also be informed of these new
conditions for their consideration.
Summary
Traditional aviation accident and incident investigation methodology
provides an exceptional foundation for SMS investigations through a holistic
approach to identify safety deficiencies. This leads to a more robust safety risk
assessment for the mitigation of such deficiencies. The just-culture evaluation of
incident and occurrence investigation further demonstrates to the organization the
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value of continual safety improvement to better support the efficiency and
sustainability and of the organization.

https://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa/vol1/iss1/1
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/ijaaa.2014.1002

12

Schreckengast: SMS - Reaching beyond low hanging fruit

References
Australian Transport Safety Board (ATSB). (2003). Transport Safety
Investigation Act 2003 Part 3 - Compulsory and Voluntary Reporting.
Canberra, Australia: Author.
Civil Aviation Safety Agency. (2009a). Civil Aviation Advisory Publication
(CAAP) – SMS-1. Safety Management System Requirements Regular
Public Transport Operations. Canberra, Australia: Author.
Civil Aviation Safety Agency. (2009b). Civil Aviation Advisory Publication
(CAAP) – SMS-2. Integration of Human Factors (HF) into Safety
Management Systems (SMS). Canberra, Australia: Author.
Civil Aviation Safety Regulation (CASR) (2013). Part 142 - Integrated and multi
crew pilot flight training and contracted recurrent training and checking.
Canberra, Australia: Author.
European Union (EU.) (2010). The investigation and prevention of accidents and
incidents in civil aviation. Investigation Regulation No 996/2010
Directive 94/56/EC.
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Advisory Circular (1976). AC 120-30A
Reporting Requirements of Air Carriers, Commercial Operators, Travel
Clubs, and Air Taxi Operators of Large and Small Aircraft. Washington,
DC: Author.
FAA. (2010). Advisory Circular - AC 120-92A Introduction to SMSs for Aviation
Service Providers. Washington, DC: Author.
FAA. (n.d.) Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Part 91 – General Operating and
Flight Rules. Washington, DC: Author.
Gesell, L. E. & Dempsey, P. S. (2011). Aviation and the Law, 5th ed. Chandler,
AZ: Coast Aire Publications.
ICAO. (2003). Circular 298 - Training Guidelines for Aircraft Incident
Investigators. Montreal, Canada: Author.

Published by Scholarly Commons, 2014

13

International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, Vol. 1 [2014], Iss. 1, Art. 1

ICAO. (2008). Circular 315 – Hazards at Aircraft Incident Sites. Montreal,
Canada: Author.
ICAO. (2010). Annex 13 - Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation. Montreal,
Canada: Author.
ICAO. (2012). Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation (Doc
9756). Montreal, Canada: Author.
ICAO. (2013a). Safety Management Manual (3rd ed.) (Doc 9859). Montreal,
Canada: Author.
ICAO. (2013b). Annex 19 - Safety Management. Montreal, Canada: Author.
Reason, J. (1990). Human Error. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
United Kingdom, Aviation Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) (2013).
Aircraft Accidents and Serious Incidents Guide for Airline Operations.
Hampshire, UK: Author.
United Kingdom, Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). (2006). Civil Aviation
Publication (CAP) 642 – Airside Safety Management. West Sussex, UK:
Author.
United Kingdom, Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). (2013). Civil Aviation
Publication (CAP) 1059 – Safety Management Systems: Guidance for
small, non-complex organisations. West Sussex, UK: Author.
United States National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Part 830
Notification and reporting of aircraft accidents or incidents and overdue
aircraft, and preservation of aircraft wreckage, mail, cargo and records.
Washington, DC: Author.

https://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa/vol1/iss1/1
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/ijaaa.2014.1002

14

Schreckengast: SMS - Reaching beyond low hanging fruit

Appendix
Case Study on employee nourishment:
Hazard Identification – Through voluntary reports and observations from
safety team members, it has been identified that some pilots and maintenance staff
are exhibiting decreased performance near the end of their work schedule. In
discussion with these groups, it was identified that the organization has not
included the importance of adequate nourishment during induction and periodic
human factors training as required by regulatory guidance.
Safety Policy:
The organization’s SMS should provide a process for a proactive and
integrated approach to Safety. This should include the active support of both
employees and management. The Safety Policy should describe the structure and
scope of the organization, resources, staff responsibilities and how safety
decisions are managed throughout the organization. The current policy does not
address nourishment.
Safety Risk Management:
Existing Mitigation – the organization has several vending machines that
have candy and soft drinks along with a poster discussion proper hydration during
the summer.
Current Level of Risk – because the organization is not near a restaurant,
staff often bring food from home or rely on the snacks available. Also, because
time for meals is not built into the work schedule, employees often simply eat at
their desk or while walking to or from meetings. The severity of such lack of
proper nourishment is moderate and the likelihood of the lack of nourishment is
also moderate.
Risk Tolerability – the safety team has determined that the lack of proper
nourishment and time to consume such nourishment has decreased the efficiency
and safety of the organization to an Unacceptable Level requiring attention.
Further mitigation – the safety team has determined that an additional
nourishment and training policy must be implemented. The vending company has
been contacted to provide more nourishing options and a mobile catering
company has been contacted to provide a hot meal during each shift.
Furthermore, the staff is encouraged to not eat meals at their desk and the lunch
room has been expanded to provide free water, microwaves, and refrigerators.
Revised Level of Risk – following a test period, the safety team determined
that the new policy, training and resources provided have achieved an acceptable
level of safety. It was further noted that employee happiness and efficiency had
increased.
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Safety Assurance:
The safety team monitors the induction and periodic training programs to
ensure the continued emphasis on nourishment and hydration. The safety team
also monitors regulatory guidance material for new programs or initiatives
regarding nourishment.
Safety Training and Promotion:
The initial induction program now includes nourishment and hydration,
with periodic promotion during changes in seasons and duty locations. The safety
team also conducts an annual competition for employees and their families
regarding nourishment, soliciting menus and posters to be used throughout the
year to remind employees of the importance of proper nourishment and hydration.
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